gossip, ostracism). These observations, even if true, in no way conflict with strong reciprocity models of social cooperation. First, if punishment is effective, it will be rarely carried out. Thus, the absence of frequent punishment is indication that the threat of punishment has a particularly strong effect. For instance, the average tax payer in the United States is never penalized for tax evasion, yet no one doubts the importance of prosecuting tax evasion. Similarly, most drivers receive only a few traffic citations in the course of their lives, but many drivers adjust their driving to avoid citations. Second, we stress that most humans are very averse to public criticism of even a verbal form of punishment, and we cite studies that show that verbal criticism alone often leads to conformity (Masclet et al. 2003) . In addition, the human emotion of shame serves to amplify social criticism, thereby lessening the need for costly punishment (Gintis 2004, Bowles and Gintis 2005) . Moreover Guala seriously understates the importance of diffuse, uncoordinated, costly punishment in promoting norm-adherence.
Gaula claims that some punishment is zero cost. If so, this would add an interesting dimension to the strong reciprocity model, but it does not conflict with this model.
In sum, we agree with Guala that social structured punishment is important, but we assert that the predisposition to reward goodness and punish evil underlies the effectiveness of socially structured punishment. We also reaffirm the critical importance of diffuse, unstructured, cooperation and punishment in fostering social efficiency and a high quality of life. 
